

7 July 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Meeting with Anne Armstrong
8 July 1987, 1000 hours, HQS

Anne Armstrong is coming to brief you on PFIAB's recommendations and/or current thinking regarding the new embassy building in Moscow and general overseas security policy. I believe you already are well-informed of the overall state-of-play regarding the various studies and proposals underway -- especially after your meeting with Secretary Shultz.

At Tab A is a paper [redacted] offering his thoughts on both the Moscow problem and the more general question of beefing up overseas security.

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At Tab B is a paper provided by Bill Donnelly, the Deputy Director for Administration, which sheds some light on what you are likely to hear from Anne Armstrong on PFIAB's recommendation regarding the new embassy building. One of Bill's people got the information from Randy Fort of the PFIAB staff. For your information, the "JASON" referred to is a panel of leading scientists who do consulting work for PFIAB.

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[redacted]

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Attachments

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7 July 1987

NOTE FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Executive Director
SUBJECT: 8 July PFIAB Briefing on Embassy Security

We understand that Anne Armstrong and staff hope to brief you on 8 July about their ideas on embassy security. As I mentioned Monday, the Laird Commission, Jim Schlesinger, and the PFIAB all will have proposals on the table this month. In addition, there are at least a dozen bills in Congress relating to aspects of this issue. Barry Kelly on the NSC Staff believes that he is responsible for pulling these ideas together, seeking NSPG views, and making a recommendation to Carlucci for the President.

Schlesinger's proposal to remove the three top floors from the existing new embassy building in Moscow, rebuild that facility, and add a new classified annex is public knowledge. We are less certain what the Laird Commission and the PFIAB will finally recommend. PFIAB staffers tell us the PFIAB will propose solutions to the Moscow problem as well as a fundamental reorganization of the entire State Department overseas security apparatus, including the creation of a new security organization separate from the Department but reporting to the Secretary of State, as do, for example, USIA and AID. It's not clear how State will react officially to PFIAB's reorganization plan. My sense is that working levels there hope that the entire issue will go away; others within State may believe that the PFIAB plan offers opportunities.

With respect to Moscow alone, Kelly tells us that the Schlesinger proposal has important deficiencies from the NSC's point of view; on the other hand, Schlesinger has told me that the Secretary is fully committed and plans to move toward implementation. We will need to study the specific proposals that are advanced and make our views known at the proper time.

On the broader issue of how the US Government is organized to deal with overseas security issues, CIA has generally taken the position that this is State's responsibility, and that we should resist major bureaucratic or programmatic involvement. We are very willing to help, however, and do indeed have a strong interest in seeing the situation improved.

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In the next few months, there will be many ideas on the table as to how to deal with this broader issue. Whatever fix is made needs to take account of the three basic elements of the overseas security problem--physical, technical, and personnel security--and the inextricable relationship between and among them. Any solution needs to recognize that there is no point in doing a first class job with respect to technical security if physical security issues aren't addressed, and no point in working hard on either of those if personnel vulnerabilities are not addressed.

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3) Will the proposal provide some sort of process in which selected overseas facilities are certified as meeting specified physical and technical security standards?

Whatever else is accomplished by the current debate, we need objective standards against which compliance can be measured. And violations of the standards must have consequences. Moreover, an absence of certification should mean that certain kinds of sensitive information will not be allowed at that site.

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PFIAB's proposed new organization potentially could help answer questions 1, 2 and 3. Question 4 probably can only be addressed through NSC action to

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Bill Donnelly [] have both read and approved this paper.

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